1973 by Yigal Kipnis

Author:Yigal Kipnis
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Bisac Code: HIS019000, POL011010
ISBN: 9781935982388
Publisher: Just World Books
Published: 2014-02-01T05:00:00+00:00

“The Americans Are Talking a Lot about the Need for Progress”

In mid-September, Ambassador Dinitz took advantage of Kissinger’s confirmation hearings to return to Israel for consultations. On the evening of September 10, before he left for Israel, he met with Kissinger in the White House. Kissinger told him that the pressure from Washington to come up with new political steps would increase and that it was important for Israel to appear to have initiated proposals for progress.30 Kissinger expressed optimism regarding the political process with Egypt. “Egypt is already willing to make a separate peace,” he said and added, “It is extraordinary that the Egyptians have not leaked my negotiations with Ismail. It shows they have not given up yet on my approach.”31

When they remained alone, Kissinger requested that Dinitz “explain again and again to the prime minister that, in a reasonable period after elections, we will have to respond to the question of how to continue the game without giving up any card which is vital to us.”32 After Dinitz left for Israel, his deputy notified him that it had been leaked to the media that, at their meeting, Kissinger had hinted that “a change in US policy toward Israel should be expected.”33

The ambassador took the hint and, on his way to Israel, emphasized to the media that “his contacts in the US government repeatedly stressed that the situation under no condition could remain at a standstill and that there would have to be intense efforts to find a solution. Dinitz added, “It is clear that Professor Kissinger intends to initiate a new diplomatic offensive in the Middle East after the Israeli election.”34 He continued along these lines at a cabinet meeting: “The Americans are talking a lot about the need for progress in political initiatives, and they expect Israel to be the one to make this progress.”35 Dayan was planning to leave for the United States on December 8, after the new Israeli government was installed, “to investigate various proposals that would lead to a practical and not just a political thaw in the freeze.”36

These public pronouncements by both Dayan and Dinitz echoed the atmosphere in Washington, which was preparing for a new and unusual era in US foreign affairs in which the White House national security advisor would also be serving as the secretary of state. The new atmosphere in Washington was anchored in a document written by Bill Quandt, one of Kissinger’s close aides in the National Security Council, who in his report predicted that progress would take place when Sadat proposed that Israel recognize Egyptian sovereignty over all of Sinai. The disengagement would continue for ten to fifteen years and would leave an opening for bargaining over limited areas that would remain under Israeli authority. During this period, Quandt expected differences of opinion in the viewpoints of the United States and Israel.37 In his Senate testimony during his confirmation hearings, Kissinger called for negotiations in the Middle East: “Israel and the Arabs must be ready to carry out difficult decisions resulting from the agreement.

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